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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study investigated relations between pay-for-performance incentives designed to 
vary in instrumentality (annual pay-for-performance, quarterly pay-for-performance, and base 
pay level) and employee outcomes (self-reported work effort and turnover intention) in a 
longitudinal study spanning more than two years. After controlling for perceived instrumentality, 
merit pay increase, and the initial values of the dependent variables, the amount of base pay was 
positively related to work effort and negatively related to turnover intention, where both 
relationships were mediated by autonomous motivation. The amounts of quarterly and annual 
pay-for-performance were both positively related to controlled motivation, but were differently 
related to the dependent variables due to different relations with autonomous motivation.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Pay for performance (PFP) refers to pay programs in which pay is contingent on 
performance and where performance can be measured in terms of results (e.g., number of sales) 
or (evaluations of) behavior (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). Tying individual PFP to results-based 
criteria has the capacity to generate strong motivational effects, and there is meta-analytical 
evidence for a positive relation between individual variable PFP and performance quantity 
(Jenkins, Gupta, Mitra, & Shaw, 1998), performance on simple tasks (Stajkovic & Luthans, 
2003), and performance on uninteresting laboratory tasks (Weibel, Rost, & Osterloh, 2010). 
Some authors have even argued that “no other incentive or motivational technique comes even 
close to money with respect to its instrumental value” (Locke, Feren, McCaled, Shaw, & Denny, 
1980, p. 379). The main explanation for a positive relation between variable PFP and 
performance is instrumentality, that is, the perceived link between performance and pay, that in 
turn increases effort (A. J. Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor, 2013; Vroom, 1964). Whereas Vroom’s 
(1964) expectancy theory and some compensation researchers conceptualize motivation as a 
unidimensional construct, other theories of motivation posit that the motivation that is the focus 
in expectancy theory is of an extrinsic nature, since it refers to performing an activity with the 
intention of attaining positive consequences (e.g., obtaining a reward) or avoiding negative 
consequences (e.g. avoiding a punishment) (Deci & Ryan, 2000). 
Another factor found to yield high employee performance is the degree to which 
employees are autonomously motivated towards their work (Cerasoli, Nicklin, & Ford, 2014). 
Autonomous motivation is defined in self-determination theory (SDT) as doing something out of 
interest, enjoyment, values, and meaning (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Research has shown that on 
average, autonomous motivation yields better outcomes than controlled motivation, which 
involves doing something to obtain a reward or avoid a punishment (Deci & Ryan, 2008). 
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Another proposition made by SDT is that under certain circumstances, external rewards can 
decrease autonomous forms of motivation, with meta-analytic evidence showing negative effects 
ranging from (d) -.14 to -.44 (Deci, Ryan, & Koestner, 1999). Recent meta-analytical evidence 
comprising four decades of research has also showed that autonomous motivation is moderately 
to strongly associated with higher performance in school, work, and physical domains (Cerasoli 
et al., 2014). Interestingly, autonomous motivation had effects on both quality and quantity of 
performance, while the provision of an incentive (very broadly defined) only had a positive effect 
on performance quantity. Because incentives in this meta-analysis were very broadly defined 
(e.g., credit for study participation, award, pay, etc.), it cannot inform us about the subtleties of 
different compensation systems’ effects on autonomous motivation in the work domain. 
Furthermore, the meta-analysis by Cerasoli et al. (2014) investigated relations between 
incentives, autonomous motivation, and performance, but did not include controlled motivation, 
which is the type of motivation that theoretically should explain the relation between variable 
PFP and work performance.  
Gagné and Forest (2008) proposed a testable model to assess the effects of compensation 
system characteristics on work motivation. In this model, they argued that the ratio of variable to 
fixed pay portions would influence work motivation, such that the higher the proportion of 
variable pay based on performance, the lower the autonomous motivation and the higher the 
controlled motivation. The authors argued that this is due to the negative effect of incentive pay 
on feelings of autonomy. The ratio of variable to fixed pay is one way to operationalize 
instrumentality between performance and reward, though by no means the only one, as other 
considerations, such as whether performance is measured by results versus behaviors and whether 
the reward is group or individual-based can also affect instrumentality perceptions (Gerhart, 
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Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009). Yet another way to increase instrumentality is to increase the frequency 
of incentive payouts, which is the focus of the current study.  
The present study investigated how PFP components designed to vary in instrumentality 
(base pay, variable annual pay, and variable quarterly pay) relate to changes in self-reported work 
effort and turnover intention, and whether these relationships are mediated by autonomous and 
controlled motivation. We predict two different pathways from PFP to work effort and to 
turnover intention, one from the amount of base pay received over time via autonomous 
motivation and one from the amount of quarterly and annual variable PFP via controlled 
motivation (see Figure 1). We chose self-reported work effort as a dependent variable because it 
has been strongly associated with other measures of performance (De Cooman, De Gieter, 
Pepermans, Jegers, & Van Acker, 2009), and it is a more proximal outcome of employee 
motivation than results-oriented measures of performance. The latter are often affected by factors 
such as ability and by factors not entirely under the control of the individual employee1. Turnover 
intention was included for several reasons. First, an often ignored effect of variable PFP is the 
sorting effect, namely that variable PFP may attract and retain productive workers while less 
productive workers to a larger extent may want to leave due to lower pay levels (see Gerhart et 
al., 2009 for a review). Yet, how the two pathways relate to changes in turnover intention is a 
relatively open question. The amount of pay received from each of the three pay components 
could theoretically be related to a decrease in turnover intention, but if variable PFP works 
exclusively via controlled motivation, the amount of pay received as variable PFP may actually 
relate to an increase in turnover intention due to lower employee well-being (e.g., Vansteenkiste 
                                                 
1In sales, the output of an employee might for instance be impacted by the economic context, the type of products or 
services, marketing campaigns, and the size of the client list.  
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et al., 2007). There is in fact evidence that compensation based 100% on commissions is related 
to high turnover rates due to the high levels of stress (Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996). 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The current study makes several contributions. To our knowledge, this is the first study to 
simultaneously investigate actual pay data from different PFP components over time (two years), 
and to assess changes in relevant outcomes. Most studies of PFP have investigated the presence 
or contingency of pay without considering the amount received (Cerasoli et al., 2014), have 
focused on a single pay component, have been cross-sectional, and have investigated a single 
employee outcome. The current study is also the first to investigate motivation as a mediator and 
to include both controlled and autonomous motivation. Previous field and experimental studies of 
PFP have failed to directly investigate the main mechanism (i.e., motivation) that is hypothesized 
to explain the effects of incentives, something that has recently been called for in recent reviews 
of the compensation literature (Gerhart & Fang, 2015). In addition, though many organizations 
pay employees using different PFP components (Gerhart et al., 2009), the total compensation in 
most industrialized countries is composed largely of base pay, with a relatively small 
performance-contingent portion (Thierry, 2002). Although a mix of base and variable pay may be 
the rule rather than the exception in many organizations, most empirical research has typically 
investigated clear-cut programs (Barnes, Hollenbeck, Jundt, Scott DeRue, & Harmon, 2011; 
Kuvaas, 2006). As a result, our empirically based knowledge about individual variable PFP may 
overestimate the effects of pay with strong instrumentality, as studies have typically not 
controlled for other pay components, such as base pay. There is in fact evidence that base pay, in 
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particular whether its amount meets or exceeds market averages, may have an effect on 
autonomous motivation (Kuvaas, 2006). As such, the present study investigated the relative and 
unique effects of PFP components designed to vary in instrumentality. Base pay is usually 
assumed to have low instrumentality because employees receive the same amount almost 
independently of their short-term performance, as long as they are not laid off, whereas variable 
PFP is assumed to have stronger instrumentality. For this reason, many past studies have actually 
operationalized instrumentality as the proportion of PFP in an individual’s pay package (Zenger 
& Marshall, 2000). We chose to test this very assumption by investigating how different pay 
components (base pay and variable PFP) designed to vary in instrumentality independently relate 
to autonomous and controlled motivation.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Most micro research on variable PFP has relied on instrumentality theories, such as 
expectancy theory and reinforcement theory (Fall & Roussel, 2014). Expectancy theory (Vroom, 
1964) posits that individuals will engage in behaviors that are likely to lead to valued outcomes, 
as long as they perceive that they can successfully produce such behaviors. Reinforcement theory 
states that behaviors followed by a reinforcer (i.e., something that increases the desired 
behavioral response) are more likely to recur in the future (e.g. Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003), and 
thus focuses on experiences rather than expectations. When applied to compensation research, 
these theories view the link between behaviors and rewards, that is instrumentality, and its effect 
on work effort as the keys to effective financial incentives (Lawler, 1971). Instrumentality 
theories have received substantial meta-analytical support for performance quantity (Jenkins et 
al., 1998) and for less interesting tasks (Weibel et al., 2010). However, as work is increasingly 
knowledge based, and assessed qualitatively, it may indicate that variable PFP may no longer be 
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the best choice of incentives to meet organizational goals. A theory like SDT may be more 
encompassing than instrumentality theories (which mainly posits the presence of only extrinsic 
motivation in the workplace) in order to have a better understanding of the effects of incentives 
on both autonomous and controlled motivation.  
Pay, Motivation, and Work Effort 
According to instrumentality theories, employees should increase their effort in response 
to the opportunity of earning variable PFP. In line with instrumentality theories, SDT generally 
predicts positive effects of variable PFP on work effort for tasks with relatively straightforward 
solutions (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Gagné & Forest, 2008). In that case, the positive effect of 
variable PFP on work effort would be mediated by controlled motivation. At the same time, 
variable PFP may decrease autonomous motivation, which has been found to relate positively to 
quality of work performance and to the performance of complex tasks (Cerasoli et al., 2014; 
Gagné & Deci, 2005; Weibel et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, SDT proposes that 
environmental events and structures that make people feel controlled or pressured, such as 
contingent rewards, are likely to decrease autonomous motivation (Deci et al., 1999). This effect 
varies depending on the impact that the reward has on feelings of autonomy and feelings of 
competence (Moller & Deci, 2014). Performance-contingent rewards can serve as informational 
feedback that boosts feelings of competence, which can enhance both controlled and autonomous 
motivation, but they can also change the locus of causality of the person, such that the person is 
more likely to feel like a pawn than an agent of his or her own behavior (DeCharms, 1968), 
thereby decreasing autonomous motivation. Moreover, satisfaction of the need for relatedness — 
another important predictor of autonomous motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000) — may also be 
reduced, as the amount of variable PFP received may be perceived as an impersonal exchange 
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(Shore, Tetrick, Lynch, & Barksdale, 2006) of monetary compensation in return for meeting 
specified performance standards for a finite period of time (e.g., daily, monthly, quarterly, or 
annual). Thus, combining these effects, we can predict a net effect of variable PFP on work effort 
that is weaker than instrumentality theories would predict. Therefore, we hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 1: The relation between the amount of annual variable PFP and an increase 
in work effort is (a) positively mediated by controlled motivation and (b) negatively 
mediated by autonomous motivation.  
Hypothesis 2: The relation between the amount of quarterly variable PFP and an increase 
in work effort is (a) positively mediated by controlled motivation and (b) negatively 
mediated by autonomous motivation.  
Even though base pay can be influenced by annual merit pay increases based on results 
and/or (evaluations of) behavior, it is much less dependent on recent performance than variable 
PFP. Relying on instrumentality theories and reviews of the compensation literature (Gerhart & 
Fang, 2015; Gerhart et al., 2009), we should therefore not expect that the amount of base pay will 
impact on work effort through controlled motivation. Relying on SDT, however, the amount of 
base pay can influence other relevant employee outcomes if it is interpreted as recognition of 
competence, as autonomy supportive, or as fostering relatedness (Gagné & Forest, 2008). With 
respect to base pay and autonomous motivation, one study of  knowledge workers has found that 
autonomous motivation partly mediated the relationship between base pay level and work 
performance (Kuvaas, 2006). Kuvaas argued that the base pay level may serve as a stronger 
signal of overall employee worth to the organization than variable PFP. While the latter is the 
result of the last year’s or the last quarter’s performance, base pay level usually reflects several 
years of prior performance, in addition to other behaviors and characteristics such as skills, 
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education, and expressed attitudes. Furthermore, base pay can be seen as a more reliable signal 
because it is less influenced by temporal factors (Gardner, Van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004). Therefore, 
employees may interpret their base pay level relative to market averages as a reliable signal of 
how much the organization values them for what they bring to the organization. Variable PFP, on 
the other hand, may to a larger extent be interpreted as how much the organization values 
employees’ recent contributions.  Therefore, we hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 3: The relation between the amount of base pay and an increase in work effort 
is positively mediated by autonomous motivation.  
With regards to a comparison of the different pay components, we expect, based on the 
findings that base pay will have a more positive net effect on autonomous work motivation, that 
base pay will be more strongly and positively associated with work effort than annual and 
quarterly variable PFP. Though previous research has never tested relations between incentives 
and work effort, it has found positive relations between autonomous work motivation and work 
effort, and no relation with controlled motivation (Gagné, 2014). 
Pay, Motivation, and Turnover Intention 
An often ignored effect of variable PFP is the sorting effect, namely that variable PFP 
may attract and retain productive workers while less productive workers to a larger extent may 
want to leave due to lower pay levels (see Gerhart et al., 2009 for a review). Such a sorting effect 
suggests that an accumulated amount of variable PFP over time should be associated with a 
decrease in turnover intention. Still, if variable PFP decreases autonomous motivation, it may 
actually have a positive effect on turnover intention. Indeed, research shows that variable PFP 
can push people into quitting sales jobs that rely heavily on commissions (Harrison et al., 1996), 
and having one’s autonomy supported in a volunteer job context negatively predicts actual 
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volunteer turnover (Gagné, 2003). We still think, however, that the negative net effect of variable 
PFP on turnover intention will be greater than the positive effect on turnover intention caused by 
a decrease in autonomous motivation. Therefore, we hypothesize:   
Hypothesis 4: The relation between the amount of annual variable PFP and a decrease in 
turnover intention is (a) positively mediated by controlled motivation and (b) negatively 
mediated by autonomous motivation.  
Hypothesis 5: The relation between the amount of quarterly variable PFP and a decrease 
in turnover intention is (a) positively mediated by controlled motivation and (b) negatively 
mediated by autonomous motivation.  
Based on the above reasoning, the amount of base pay should be associated with an 
increase in autonomous motivation and a decrease in turnover intention. First, feelings of being 
highly valued should satisfy the needs for competence and relatedness, which are known to 
enhance autonomous motivation and well-being in general at work and to reduce turnover 
intention (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Richer, Blanchard, & Vallerand, 2002; Van den Broeck, 
Vansteenkiste, De Witte, & Lens, 2008). Second, the relatively non-contingent nature of base pay 
implies that the organization trusts employees’ ability and motivation to work well, which should 
in particular satisfy the needs for autonomy and competence. Finally, since the total 
compensation is composed largely of base pay, the sorting effect predicts that those with the 
highest base pay should have lower turnover intention. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 6: The relation between the amount of base pay and a decrease in turnover 
intention is mediated by autonomous motivation.  
METHOD 
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Sample and Procedure  
 We conducted an electronic survey in a Norwegian insurance company where we initially 
surveyed approximately 700 salespeople in February 2007 (Time 1), after they had been 
informed about the variable PFP plan, but before any payout episodes. The first survey was used 
to collect baseline data for work effort and turnover intention, and we received complete 
responses from 643 employees, corresponding to a response rate of approximately 92%. The high 
response rate can probably be explained by the fact that we collected the data as part of an 
organization-wide electronic employee survey where employees are expected to participate 
without any incentives (e.g., lottery or money). We then conducted a second survey in 
March/April 2008 (Time 2), which provided data on the perceived instrumentality of the PFP 
plans. This survey resulted in 471 complete responses, of which 469 matched the first survey. 
The third and final survey, which collected data on the mediating and dependent variables, was 
conducted in April/May 2009 (Time 3), and resulted in 368 complete responses and 322 
responses that matched the first and second surveys. In light of this attrition, we tested for 
potential non-response bias by comparing the scores of persisting participants with the scores of 
dropout participants using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The results from these tests 
indicated that dropouts scored slightly higher (M = 2.68, SD = 1.16) than persisting participants 
(M = 2.32, SD = 1.03) on turnover intention (F(1.644 = 17.05, p < .001), which might be an 
indication of non-response bias. On the other hand, the mean difference was modest (i.e. < .36) 
and Cohen’s effect size value (d =  .33) suggested small to moderate practical significance 
(Cohen, 1988). No significant difference was found between dropouts (M = 4.03, SD = .53) and 
persisting participants (M = 4.07, SD = .45) on work effort (p = .23).  
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The final sample of 322 employees served two different markets, businesses and 
consumers. Those serving businesses (business to business, B2B) (n = 101) received annual 
payouts, and those serving consumers (business to consumers, B2C) (n = 221) received quarterly 
payouts. The difference in payout frequency reflected the company’s intention to have higher 
instrumentality for the employees serving customers, as the potential trade-off between high sales 
effort and customer service was expected to provide positive results. The rationale behind the 
annual payout and intended lower instrumentality for those serving businesses was that sales 
efforts that were too high could potentially hurt existing customer relationships or result in fewer 
new customers. Furthermore, the new pay plan did not imply any cut in the base pay and every 
employee had the opportunity to earn variable pay. In order to save variable PFP costs and 
increase the instrumentality for both groups, the company decided to reward only “top 
performers” with variable pay added to their base pay (see Table 1 for percentages). The 
company provided us with data on base pay and variable PFP. The variable payout for the B2B 
employees was the sum of the end-of-year variable payouts for the years 2007 and 2008. For the 
B2C employees, we aggregated the variable pay received from the eight quarters of 2007 and 
2008. The base pay level is the sum of the base pay for the years 2007 and 2008. Based on 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) and as shown in Table 1, the B2B employees received on average 
higher base (p < .001) and variable (p < .001) pay, and a larger proportion of them received 
variable pay than the B2C employees (p < .05).  
Measures 
Because of high values of skewness and kurtosis for the pay variables, logarithmic 
transformations were performed before conducting analyses. The first survey (Time 1) assessed 
the initial value of the dependent variables, that is, self-reported work effort and turnover 
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intention. The second survey (Time 2) assessed the perceived instrumentality of the PFP plans, 
whereas the third survey (Time 3) assessed the mediating and dependent variables. Unless 
otherwise noted, the items were assessed on five-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Figure 2 displays the timeline of the surveys and the payouts. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 Controlled and autonomous motivation. We measured controlled motivation (α = .79) by 
a previously used four-item (e.g., “It is important for me to have an external incentive to strive 
for in order to do a good job”) scale (Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2010). Autonomous motivation (α = .92) 
was assessed by six items previously used by Kuvaas (2006) and developed further by Dysvik 
and Kuvaas (2008) that represent both intrinsic motivation (e.g., “My job is so interesting that it 
is a motivation in itself”) and identified regulation (e.g., “My job is meaningful”). 
Self-reported work effort. To measure self-reported work effort at Time 1 (α = .77) and 
Time 3 (α = .81), we employed a previously used six-item (e.g., “I almost always expend more 
than an acceptable level of effort”) scale of work performance (Kuvaas, 2006).  
Turnover intention. We measured turnover intention at Time 1 (α = .91) and Time 3 (α = 
.91) by a previously used five-item (e.g., “I may quit my present job during the next twelve 
months”) scale (Kuvaas, 2006).   
Control variables. Since perceived instrumentality, that is the degree to which employees 
see a link between performance and pay, is central to instrumentality theories, we controlled for 
perceived instrumentality of the PFP (both base and variable pay). Perceived instrumentality of 
PFP (α = .79) was measured by five items (e.g., “I see a clear connection between my work 
performance and my paycheck”) developed for the current study. Finally, even employees who 
13 
 
are well paid may feel underappreciated if they do not experience satisfactory pay growth, which 
in turn may increase actual turnover or turnover intention (A. Nyberg, 2010). Therefore, we also 
controlled for the latest available data on merit pay increase, that is, we divided the pay for 2008 
by the base pay for 2007. Unfortunately, we did not have access to the base pay for 2009 and 
could not calculate the latest merit pay increase. With respect to demographics, we only have data 
from 205 of the 322 respondents. These data were collected as part of another study and was 
collected after Time 3 of the present study. Among the 205 respondents, 41.5 per cent were 
women and 58,5 per cent were men, 55,6 per cent held a university degree of three years’ study 
or more, and their average tenure was 15.5 years.  
RESULTS 
We estimated a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using MPlus v7.3 and the WLSMV 
estimator to examine the fit of our measurement model. Specifically, we estimated a seven-factor 
model representing work effort at T1, turnover intention at T1, perceived instrumentality at T2, 
autonomous motivation at T3, controlled motivation at T3, work effort at T3, and turnover 
intention at T3. The CFA was performed using cluster robust standard errors (at the department 
level), and we allowed for correlations among the disturbance terms within each time point (e.g., 
one item in the work effort scale at T1 was allowed to correlate with the corresponding item at 
T3). To interpret goodness of fit, authorities have suggested  criteria in which the RMSEA at .05 
or less and the CFI and TLI at .95 or higher are considered evidence of adequate model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). In light of this, the results indicated that our seven-factor model fit the data well, 
χ² [597] = 850.40, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.036, CFI = 0.97, TLI = 0.97. Furthermore, the average 
standardized factor loading was .78. Finally, the scales demonstrated good reliability as indicated 
by Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .77 to .81. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the variables in the study. 
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-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Rather than relying on the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach, we tested our hypotheses 
using structural equation modelling (SEM) and the delta method procedure in Mplus (using the 
Sobel test with cluster robust standard errors). The SEM approach is preferable to the causal steps 
approach of Baron and Kenny (1986) because it provides a quantification of the indirect effect 
itself, and estimates everything at the same time rather than assuming independent equations (e.g. 
Zhao, Lynch, & Chen, 2010). Moreover, Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach has been shown to 
be among the lowest in statistical power (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). The SEM results are 
presented in Table 3, and graphically illustrated in Figure 3.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
The structural model that we estimated indicated good fit to the data, χ² [736] = 1174.68, 
p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.043, CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.93. The results revealed a positive relation 
between the amount of base pay and autonomous motivation (β = .28, p < .001), as well as 
positive relations between the amount of annual varaible PFP and controlled motivation (β = .18, 
p < .001) and between quarterly varaible PFP and controlled motivation (β = .32, p < .001). The 
results also unveiled a significant negative relation between annual variable PFP and autonomous 
motivation (β = -.12, p < .01). Furthermore, both autonomous (β = .61, p < .001) and controlled 
(β = .11, p < .01) motivation predicted an increase in work effort, whereas autonomous 
motivation (β = -.56, p < .001) was associated with a decrease in turnover intention and 
controlled motivation was associated with an increase in turnover intention (β = .20, p < .001).  
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In support of Hypothesis 1, the results of the structural equation model demonstrate that 
the amount of annual variable PFP relates to an increase in work effort indirectly via (a) 
controlled motivation (standardized effect = .02, p < .05) and a decrease in work effort via (b) 
autonomous motivation (standardized effect = -.07, p < .01). Since the direct relation between 
annual variable PFP and an increase in work effort was not statistically significant (β = .02, n.s.), 
the mediation is classified as indirect-only mediation (Zhao et al., 2010), suggesting that 
autonomous and controlled motivation fully mediated the relation between annual variable PFP 
and an increase in work effort. Hypothesis 2 stated that the relation between the amount of 
quarterly variable PFP and an increase in work effort is (a) positively mediated by controlled 
motivation and (b) negatively mediated by autonomous motivation. In partial support of 
Hypothesis 2a, the results revealed a significant indirect relation from quarterly variable PFP to 
an increase in work effort via controlled motivation (standardized effect = .04, p < .05). Since the 
results additionally revealed a significant direct relation between quarterly variable PFP and an 
increase in work effort (β = .14, p < .01), the results suggest that controlled motivation partially 
mediated the relation between quarterly variable PFP and an increase in work effort. Hypothesis 
2b was not supported, as the indirect relation between quarterly variable PFP and a decrease in 
work effort via autonomous motivation was not statistically significant (standardized effect = -
.01, n.s.).  
In accordance with Hypothesis 3, the results demonstrated a significant indirect relation 
from the amount of base pay to an increase in work effort via autonomous motivation 
(standardized effect = .17, p < .001), along with a non-significant direct relation from base pay to 
an increase in work effort, suggesting indirect-only or full mediation. Hypothesis 4 was also 
supported, as the amount of annual variable PFP related to an increase in turnover intention 
indirectly via (a) controlled motivation (standardized effect = .04, p < .01) and via (b) 
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autonomous motivation (standardized effect = .07, p < .05). The direct relation from annual 
variable PFP to a change in turnover intention was not significant (β = .03, n.s.), suggesting that 
autonomous and controlled motivation fully mediated the relation. Hypothesis 5 contended that 
the relation between the amount of quarterly variable PFP and a decrease in turnover intention is 
(a) positively mediated by controlled motivation and (b) negatively mediated by autonomous 
motivation. In support of Hypothesis 5a, the results demonstrated a significant relation from the 
amount of quarterly variable PFP to an increase in turnover intention via controlled motivation 
(standardized effect = .06, p < .01). The amount of quarterly variable PFP, however, did not 
significantly predict an increase in turnover intention via autonomous motivation (standardized 
effect = .01, n.s.). Accordingly, Hypothesis 5b was not supported. Finally, we received support 
for Hypothesis 6, which predicted an indirect relation from the amount of base pay to a decrease 
in turnover intention via autonomous motivation (standardized effect = -.16, p < .001). 
Specifically, the results suggest that autonomous motivation fully mediated the relation from the 
amount of base pay to a decrease in turnover intention since the direct relation was not significant 
(β = -.07, n.s.). 
DISCUSSION 
Relying on classical instrumentality theories in combination with SDT, our study 
contributes to compensation research by investigating the relation between different pay 
components, changes in work effort and turnover intention over a period of more than two years. 
Specifically, our longitudinal study, with actual pay data from different PFP components, 
contributes to compensation research by providing higher external validity compared to studies 
that investigate the presence or contingency of pay that focuses on a single pay component or that 
are cross-sectional. The results of the present study, unlike what is usually portrayed in 
compensation textbooks (e.g., Gerhart & Rynes, 2003), reveal that compared to base pay, which 
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was related to increased work effort and decreased turnover intention, variable PFP was 
positively related to increased work effort, but also positively related to increased turnover 
intention.   
The most revealing aspect of the present study, however, resides in the mediating roles of 
work autonomous and controlled motivation. As most previous studies have not used SDT to 
examine the motivational effects of compensation systems, the results of the present study 
provide rich information about this very important consideration. As hypothesized, base pay was 
positively related to autonomous motivation. Autonomous motivation also completely explained 
the relation between base pay and increase in work effort. Most interesting were the mediating 
role of motivation on the relation between variable PFP and change in work effort. Annual 
variable PFP was positively related to controlled motivation and negatively related to 
autonomous motivation. Through autonomous motivation, annual variable PFP had a negative 
indirect relation with change in work effort. Through controlled motivation, annual variable PFP 
had a positive indirect relation with change in work effort. In effect, the increase in work effort 
obtained via controlled motivation cancels out due to the decrease in work effort because of a 
decrease in autonomous work motivation. Similar negative “net effects” of variable PFP have 
been obtained in an experimental vignette study of MBA students solving complex problems 
(Weibel et al., 2010), but to our knowledge not in field studies.  
In contrast, quarterly variable PFP was only positively related to controlled motivation, 
which was, in turn, associated with increased work effort. Despite the positive relations between 
quarterly variable PFP, controlled motivation, and increased work effort, it is important to note 
that the relation between autonomous motivation and increased work effort was much stronger 
than the relation between controlled motivation and increased work effort. This observation, like 
in previous research (see Deci & Ryan, 2008 for a review), speaks to the importance of 
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promoting autonomous over controlled motivation. Since variable PFP seems to primarily 
influence controlled motivation, and to sometimes negatively influence autonomous motivation, 
the present results contrast with recommendations by many compensation experts to favor 
variable PFP plans to increase employee performance. This point of view of is explained by the 
fact that they rely on expectancy theories, which focus mainly on increasing the expectancy and 
instrumentality of money (which is often thought to be the main motivator in the workplace). In 
contrast, using SDT to understand the effects of pay on work effort leads to predicting the results 
obtained in the current study. By considering different types of motivation (autonomous and 
controlled), SDT predicts that variable PFP is likely to lead to a decrease in feelings of autonomy 
(Deci et al., 1999), leading to a decrease in autonomous motivation and an increase in controlled 
motivation, resulting in less positive net effects on work effort. 
Autonomous motivation also completely explained the relation between base pay and 
decrease in turnover intention. Most interesting were the mediating role of motivation on the 
relation between variable PFP and change in turnover intention. Through the negative relation 
with autonomous motivation, annual variable PFP was related to an increase in turnover 
intention. Through controlled motivation, annual variable PFP was also related to an increase in 
turnover intention. In effect, because annual variable PFP was associated with lower autonomous 
motivation and higher controlled motivation, the net “effect” of annual variable PFP is an 
increase in turnover intention. Quarterly variable PFP, in contrast, was only positively related to 
controlled motivation, which in turn was related to increased turnover intention. The results 
therefore indicate that variable PFP (both annual and quarterly) increases turnover intention, 
while base pay decreases it.  
These findings run counter to recommendations made by compensation experts to favor 
variable PFP plans, and stand in contrast to what Gerhart and Fang (2014, p. 47) argued: “if there 
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is an undermining effect on intrinsic motivation, it is usually dominated by the positive effect of 
PFIP (pay-for-individual-performance) on extrinsic motivation”. Fang and Gerhart (2012) 
recently obtained results that are different from ours. In a study of white collar workers from 
eight different Taiwanese companies, they found that variable PFP (as reported by HR managers) 
was positively related to intrinsic task satisfaction (a proxy for intrinsic motivation). Several 
differences in the design of the study could account for the difference in results. First, several 
studies have demonstrated that there are small on no relationships between how HR managers 
and employees perceive HR practices (Edgar & Geare, 2005; Khilji & Wang, 2006). Still, Fang 
and Gerhart assessed PFP strategy through six items completed by HR managers. In contrast, we 
obtained actual pay data from the company. Second, their measure could not allow for the 
separation of different pay components, whereas ours separated base pay from variable PFP. 
Third, they only assessed intrinsic task satisfaction, whereas we assessed both autonomous and 
controlled motivation, as well as outcomes. Finally, their study was cross-sectional, whereas we 
had time lags between the measurements of different variables.   
The negative observations with respect to variable PFP in the present study could be 
caused by an increase in stress levels. A controlled work orientation has been associated with 
lower levels of well-being at work and higher levels of strain in past research (Vansteenkiste et 
al., 2007). In addition, anecdotes obtained from the company under study indicate observations of 
several instances of unacceptable means to achieve higher variable PFP. For instance, soon after 
the implementation of the variable PFP plans, the company decided to introduce rules and 
regulations with respect to stealing others’ sales and keeping hot customers warm from the end of 
one quarter to the next quarter in order to time sales strategically to maximize the variable PFP 
payout. Such unintended effects of variable PFP plans have been observed elsewhere (e.g., Cox, 
2005; Kerr, 1975; Pfeffer, 1998).  
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Our findings suggest that base pay should be given greater importance when considering 
ways to enhance employee engagement and optimal functioning. Since base pay level was 
positively related to autonomous work motivation, it appears that base pay that meets or exceeds 
market value may enhance feelings of competence, and perhaps also feelings of autonomy and 
relatedness. Whereas lower levels of work-related stress and turnover intention are obviously 
important, autonomous motivation is a potent predictor of task performance (Cerasoli et al., 
2014; Gagné & Deci, 2005; Kuvaas, 2006, 2009; Piccolo & Colquitt, 2006), OCB (Chiu & Chen, 
2005; Piccolo & Colquitt, 2006), and knowledge sharing (Foss, Minbaeva, Pedersen, & Reinholt, 
2009).  
Limitations and Strengths 
Several limitations should be acknowledged when interpreting our results. First, although 
the data were gathered at three consecutive points in time, thus satisfying the criterion of 
temporal precedence (Conway & Lance, 2010), we cannot demonstrate causality or rule out the 
possibility of reverse causality (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). Still, as we controlled for the 
initial levels of the dependent variables at Time 1, reverse causality is not very likely. A second 
limitation is the reliance on self-report data, which may limit the validity of our findings. Data on 
employee effort from other sources and actual turnover would have strengthened the study, but 
such data are more difficult to collect, especially actual turnover. However, meta-analytic 
findings have demonstrated a strong link between turnover intention and actual turnover 
(Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000) and even single item measures of self-reported work effort 
have been found to predict performance in laboratory studies (e.g., Yeo & Neal, 2004). 
Furthermore, the longitudinal nature of the study and the use of objective pay data collected from 
a different source should remedy any biases associated with the dependent variables versus the 
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control and independent variables. The collection of objective pay data also ensures more 
accurate data than if the employees themselves should have reported their pay.  
A third limitation of the present study is that the generalizability of our findings may be 
constrained by the nature of our research context (i.e., the country, organization, and particular 
variable PFP plans implemented). First, unlike sales employees who are only paid by variable 
pay, those investigated in the current study had, on average, a relatively high base pay, and the 
introduction of the variable pay plans did not imply a cut in the base pay. Second, the company 
we investigated has for a long time intended to practice high-commitment HR and recently won a 
prize for being one of the best companies in Norway with respect to the competence development 
of its employees. Accordingly, the generalizability our findings may be limited to high-
commitment organizations where the majority of the compensation package consists of base pay.  
With respect to different relations between the variable pay received through the two 
variable PFP plans, motivation, and outcomes, we cannot rule out the possibility that unmeasured 
differences between the two groups of employees have influenced our results. For instance, one-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that there was a higher proportion of men (p < .05) 
among the B2B employees (M = 1.70, SD = .46) than among the B2C employees (M = 1.53, SD 
= .50). Unfortunately, and as previously mentioned, we were not able to control for gender as we 
only had data from 205 of the 322 employees. The B2B employees also received on average 
higher base and variable pay, and a larger proportion of them received variable pay than the B2C 
employees. Accordingly, this group may be associated with a higher status in the organization 
than the other group or other differences that may be related to the mediators and/or the 
dependent variables. Although we cannot completely rule out the influence of unmeasured 
differences between the two groups, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed no 
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significant differences between the two groups with respect autonomous motivation (p = .85), 
controlled motivation (p = .43), change in work effort (p = .47) and change in turnover intention 
(p = .96). Accordingly, the most likely interpretation of our results is that is the amount of pay 
received that best explains the results obtained. This highlights the importance of collecting 
actual pay data when investigating variable PFP plans, rather than simply the presence or 
assumed instrumentality of variable PFP plans.  
A final limitation of the present study is that we have not investigated satisfaction of the 
needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, which in SDT is predicted to promote  
autonomous and controlled motivation are determined by (Gagné & Deci, 2005). Accordingly, 
future research could test need satisfaction as mediators of the relationship between pay variables 
and autonomous and controlled motivation.  
A particular strength of this study over previous ones is the fact that we conducted a 
longitudinal field study of individual PFP. Most experimental studies do not capture longitudinal 
effects effectively. Even experiments including several rounds may overestimate the positive 
effects of almost always receiving variable payouts over longer periods of time according to the 
tendency for financial incentives to have a strong initial impact that may be satiated over time 
(e.g. Peterson & Luthans, 2006). With the exception of case studies (e.g. Beer & Cannon, 2004; 
Cox, 2005; Lazear, 2000) and studies of the relation between performance, pay growth, and 
turnover (Harrison et al., 1996; A. Nyberg, 2010; Salamin & Hom, 2005; Trevor, Gerhart, & 
Boudreau, 1997), we are not aware of any field studies that have been able to take into account 
the dynamic effects of variable PFP. We also think that having several payout episodes over two 
years is a major strength of our data, as having the opportunity to receive variable PFP is not the 
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same as actually receiving it. Accordingly, the employees in our sample have two years of 
experience from receiving from no to high levels of variable PFP. 
Practical Implications 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, the present research holds some 
potentially important practical implications. First, many managers believe that the relatively non-
contingent nature of base pay makes it a poor motivating instrument (DeVoe & Iyengar, 2004; 
Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Magee, Kilduff, & Heath, 2011). The findings obtained in the 
present study, however, suggest that the amount of base pay can also positively affect employees’ 
motivation and attitudes, even among sales employees. Taking into account that base pay level 
was associated with sizeable increases in work effort and decreases in turnover intention, we 
suggest that paying top performers competitive base pay to show how valuable they are to the 
organization may be more effective than relying on variable PFP. The downside of the base pay 
level as an indicator of worth to the organization is that lower performing employees with lower 
base pay may feel less valued, which can dampen their need satisfaction and autonomous 
motivation and subsequent performance even further. Thus, it should be communicated that there 
are other determinants of base pay level, such as education level, formal skills, and market 
conditions (Thierry, 2001). Organizations should also consider implementing programs for career 
development, education, and training as a remedy for such groups of employees (Lawler & 
Finegold, 2000) and be more selective in recruiting new employees (Combs, Liu, Hall, & 
Ketchen, 2006). If, on the other hand, lack of effort is an organization-wide problem, an 
alternative to relying on variable PFP to increase effort could be to train managers to satisfy 
psychological needs by providing more information about organizational goals and how their role 
helps fulfill these objectives, and by creating a sense of belonging (e.g., Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 
2004; Meyer & Gagné, 2008).  
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The different results for the payouts from the two variable PFP plans suggest that the 
effects of variable PFP are not as dependent on the amount of money potentially or actually 
received as believed by many. For instance, Heneman, Ledford, and Gresham (2000) suggested 
that in order for variable PFP plans to be motivating, the variable pay opportunity must represent 
5–10% of the base pay. In the present study, quarterly variable PFP represented only 2.31% of 
base pay, while annual variable PFP represented 7.87% of base pay. Despite having the potential 
to be motivating enough, it seems that the frequency of payout episodes was more predictive of 
controlled motivation than the amount of variable pay received. This was supported by an 
additional Wald test (χ²[1] = 3.98, p < .05) showing that the relation between quarterly variable 
PFP and controlled motivation (β = .32, p < .001) was significantly greater than the relation 
between the amount of annual variable PFP and controlled motivation (β = .18, p < .001). In line 
with expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) and the assumptions of the insurance company, more 
frequent and smaller payouts seem to have stronger incentive effects. Accordingly, if high 
incentive intensity is what is needed, organizations should also look beyond the amount of 
variable PFP that can be earned. With respect to autonomous motivation, however, a negative 
relation was only obtained for annual variable PFP with larger but less frequent payouts.  
Compared with the efforts many organizations invest in fine-tuning their pay systems to 
solve problems associated with a lack of motivation or effort and retention issues, perhaps the 
most surprising observation based on our results is how weakly the variable pay variables are 
associated with the dependent variables. This is why some authors (e.g., Cox, 2005) argue that 
the costs and unforeseen consequences of variable pay (e.g., management time and 
administration, perceived unfairness, etc.) might not be worth the time, effort and money. 
Compared to the effect sizes of autonomous motivation on the outcomes, the effect sizes of 
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controlled motivation were much smaller. Since autonomous motivation was positively related to 
base pay, and negatively or unrelated to the variable PFP, we can argue that variable PFP had 
little effects on the outcomes. Since sizeable amounts of variable pay were obtainable and also 
received by some employees (Heneman et al., 2000), and variable PFP was based on the results 
rather than an evaluation of employee behaviors (Gerhart et al., 2009), the weak results cannot be 
explained by a weak link between performance (or results) and pay or other fatal flaws in the 
design of the pay plans. Thus, the belief among many managers that pay is a simple solution to 
complex problems (Ferraro et al., 2005; Heath, 1999) may reflect the tendency of many managers 
towards designing pay systems that overemphasize financial and material compensation (Magee 
et al., 2011). In many organizations, the large majority of the employees may be more responsive 
to motivational job designs (e.g. Humphrey, Nahrgang, & Morgeson, 2007) and relational 
rewards (Grant, 2007, 2008; Peterson & Luthans, 2006). Given the high costs of running a 
variable PFP plan, it may be advisable to seek out other solutions to motivational problems. 
Finally, both compensation and motivation scholars seem to agree that the variable PFP-
controlled motivation may reduce autonomous motivation, at least in the laboratory and among 
children and students (Deci et al., 1999). Although the relative impact of controlled and 
autonomous motivation on employee outcomes is less clear in work settings, our study suggests 
that variable PFP represents a double-edged sword, even for sales people.  
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of Pay for the 24 Months 
Pay plan Average base 
paya 
Average 
variable pay 
Average 
percentage 
of variable 
pay 
Percent of 
employees 
who received 
variable pay 
Average 
variable pay 
among those 
who received 
it 
B2C 
Quarterly 
NOK 818,300 
USD 97,985 
NOK 18,900 
USD 2,263 
2.31% 38.91% NOK 48,600 
USD 5,809 
B2B 
Annual 
NOK 966,300 
USD 115,706 
NOK 76,000 
USD 9,100 
7.87% 54.46% NOK 140,800 
USD 16,860 
aBased on currency rates from May 31, 2016; NOK = Norwegian kroner; USD US Dollars. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Scale Reliabilities 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
1. Merit pay increase 1.26 .60 -           
2. Perceived instrumentalityT2
 3.15 .83 .17** (.79)          
3. Base pay amount 5.92 .11 -.14* .17* -         
4. Annual variable PFP amount .90 1.94 .14* .16** .12* -        
5. Quarterly variable PFP amount 1.19 1.99 -.19** .10 -.18** -.25** -       
6. Autonomous motivationT3 3.80 .76 .14* .17** .23** -.06 -.07 (.92)      
7. Controlled motivationT3 3.34 .90 -.01 .16** .00 .11* .21** -.08 (.79)     
8. Work effortT1 4.07 .45 .14* .02 .03 -.04 .03 .33** -.02 (.77)    
9. Work effortT3 4.14 .45 .10 .10 .08 .01 .13* .43** .14* .57** (.81)   
10. Turnover intentionT1 2.32 1.03 -.07 -.07 .04 .10 .06 -.23** .13* -.20** -.11 (.91)  
11. Turnover intentionT3 2.37 1.01 -.17** -.17** -.22** .10 .01 -.54** .15** -.15** -.19** .44** (.91) 
Note: N = 322. Scale reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal.  *p < .05. **p < .01. The pay variables are logarithmically transformed. 
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TABLE 3 
Results of the Structural Equation Model Including Control Variables and Explained Variances 
Note. N = 332. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Standardized path coefficients are shown. 
 
 
Variable 
Autonomous 
motivationT3 
Controlled  
motivationT3 
Work  
effortT3 
Turnover  
intentionT3 
Work effortT1                .67***  
Turnover intentionT1                        .46*** 
Merit pay increase               .19**                .04              .07                     .07 
Perceived instrumentalityT2
              .35***                .03             -.32***                     .10 
Base pay amount              .28***                .02             -.02                    -.07 
Annual variable PFP amount             -.12**                .18***              .02                     .03 
Quarterly variable PFP amount             -.02                .32***              .14**                    -.08 
Autonomous motivationT3                .61***                    -.56*** 
Controlled motivationT3                .11**                     .20*** 
     
R2             .23                .11              .77                     .59  
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FIGURE 1 
Conceptual Model2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Dashed lines represent negative relationships and solid lines represent positive relationships. 
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FIGURE 2 
Study Timeline and Data Collection 
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FIGURE 3 
Structural Equation Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: N = 322. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Standardized path coefficients are shown. To simplify the graphical presentation, the additional 
path coefficients among the control variables and outcomes are reported in Table 2. 
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